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INTRODUCTION

To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of
an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are
decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity
and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to
those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually
increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it
is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.
Nothing in the biographies of the current members of the Supreme Court suggest
they are likely to be well equipped to deal with the federal securities laws or modem
financial markets. This lacunae of securities expertise is a relatively recent phenomenon.
For most of the first 50 years after the federal securities laws were adopted, the Court had
at least one Justice with a background in the securities laws, either as a regulatorWilliam 0. Douglas I-or as a practitioner-Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 2
Powell's retirement left the Rehnquist Court with a void in securities expertise for
most of its tenure, and his departure marked a significant decline in the Court's securities
caseload, as demonstrated by Table 1 below. Usually the Justices' collective lack of
familiarity with the securities laws means that few petitions for certiorari are granted in
securities cases; the Court simply does not decide that many cases in the field. As Table 1
below demonstrates, the Rehnquist Court averaged slightly more than one securities case
per term during its nearly 20 year run, a figure consistent with the average number heard
by the Warren Court.

1. A caveat is in order here. Despite Douglas's background as SEC Chairman, he exhibited little interest
in the securities laws during his time on the Court. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert P. Thompson, Securities Law
and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REv. 841, 917-20 (2009) (discussing "the role of the New Deal Justices
in enacting, defending and interpreting the federal securities laws").
2. On Powell's influence on the Court's securities law jurisprudence, see A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr.and the Counter-Revolution in the FederalSecurities Laws, 52 DuKE L.J. 841 (2003).
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Table 1: Supreme Court Securities Cases, 1936-2011
Court

Securities
Cases

Average
Per Term

Total
Cases

Securities
Percent

New Deal (1936-1954)

21

1.11

2894

0.7%

Warren (1954-1969)

17

1.06

3491

0.5%

Burger (1969-1986)

49

2.72

3828

1.3%

Rehnquist (1986-2005)

20

1.00

2173

0.9%

Roberts (2005-2011)

12

2.00

469

2.6%

Total

113

1.51

12,645

0.9%

The first six years of the Roberts Court have departed from that long-term pattern.
The Roberts Court has decided 12 cases in the field of securities law, a whopping 2.6% of
its docket. That increase suggests the Justices have taken a new interest in the field,
despite the lack of a Justice with a background in securities law.
Does this upsurge in securities cases reflect a new agenda for the Supreme Court in
the field of securities law? A closer examination of the cases suggests that the numbers
may deceive. As Table 2 demonstrates, no single Justice has stepped forward to take
charge of the field of securities regulation as Powell did during his time on the Burger
Court. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer have written more than one
majority opinion in the area. Before his retirement, Justice Stevens appears to have been
engaged with the field, but most of his seven opinions in the field were dissents or
concurrences; his interest does not translate into influence, as it did for Powell.
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Table 2: Roberts Court Securities Cases, 2005-2011
Decision

Majority

Dissent

Concur

Merrill Lynch v. Dabit
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust
Credit Suisse Securities v.

Stevens
Souter
Breyer

Thomas

Scalia
Stevens

Tellabs v. Makor Issues &
Rights
StoneridgeInv. Part.v.
Scientific-Atlanta
Jones v. HarrisAssociates
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds

Ginsburg

Stevens

Scalia, Alito

Kennedy

Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg

Morrison v. NationalAustralia
Bank

Scalia

Stevens

Free EnterpriseFund v.
PCAOB

Roberts

Breyer, Stevens,
Ginsburg,

Matrixx Initiatives v.

Sotomayor

Billing

Alito
Breyer

Thomas
Stevens,
Scalia,
Thomas
Breyer,
Stevens,
Ginsburg

Sotomayor

Siracusano

EricaP. John Fund v.

Roberts

Halliburton Co.

Janus Capital Group v. First
Derivative Traders
Opinion authors in bold.

Thomas

Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Kagan

When one turns to the substance of the opinions written in these cases, one finds
little effort to grapple with the relation between the financial markets and the securities
laws. There are vigorous debates among the Justices in some of these cases, but they
revolve around questions of statutory interpretation and the relationship between the
judiciary and the administrative state. The dominant theme is judicial modesty.
One exception would appear to be the topic of securities class actions. The passage
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995,3 and its follow-on, the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) in 1998,4 have generated a
number of interpretive opportunities for the Roberts Court. Most of these cases have
revolved around straightforward issues of statutory interpretation, but on occasion these
statutes raise issues that have forced the Justices to grapple with the policy implications

3.
amended
4.
amended

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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of their decisions for securities class action practice. Those decisions have caused critics
to label the Roberts Court as "pro business." 5 Does the "pro business" Roberts Court
have a negative attitude toward securities class actions? An examination of the overall
pattern of the Court's decisions in this area suggests a bias not toward business, but
rather, the status quo, resisting attempts to both restrict-and expand-the reach of Rule
10b-5 class actions.
I proceed as follows: The Justices' debates over the appropriate method of
interpreting statutes are analyzed in Part II. Part III looks at the perspective on the
administrative state offered in the Roberts Court's securities decisions. Part IV assesses
whether the Roberts Court has taken a hostile attitude toward securities class actions. Part
V concludes.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Three of the securities cases decided during Chief Justice Roberts's tenure have
tamed exclusively on questions of statutory interpretation. More precisely, these cases
have turned on the Court's assumptions about what Congress intended when it used
specific statutory language. That language was adopted against a backdrop of judicial
interpretations of similar language; the opinions purport to erect a predictable framework
of interpretation. These opinions betray no indication that the Roberts Court is attempting
to push the securities laws in a particular direction. The lack of an agenda in the opinions
is reinforced by another common thread; in each case, the petitions for certiorari were
granted by the Court only after a clear conflict had arose in the circuits over the particular
question of statutory interpretation. These cases were decided because the Justices felt
obligated to resolve the split, not because any member of the Court had a particular
interest in the securities topic presented.
A. SLUSA
Chief Justice Roberts' first term brought two securities cases to the Court's docket,
both involving interpretive issues arising out of SLUSA. A brief introduction to SLUSA
is necessary to set the stage for these cases. Congress adopted SLUSA in 1998, three
years after enacting the PSLRA. The PSLRA made it more difficult to allege securities
fraud by: (1) adopting a more stringent pleading standard, including heightened
requirements for pleading scienter, i.e., state of mind; 6 and (2) creating an automatic stay
of discovery. 7 Those restrictions under federal law gave rise to an exodus of securities
class actions to state court; state "blue sky" anti-fraud provisions generally lack the
procedural protections that the PSLRA affords defendants in federal securities class
actions. 8 The goal of SLUSA was to preempt state law securities cases, thereby pushing

5. See, e.g., First Monday, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A26 ("The Roberts court has championed
corporations.").
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
7. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3).
8. See generally David M. Levine & A.C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct of
1998: The Sun Sets on California'sBlue Sky Laws, 54 Bus. LAW. 1 (1998) (explaining how "most state bluesky laws ... afford investors broader relief').

HeinOnline -- 37 J. Corp. L. 109 2011-2012

The Journalof CorporationLaw

110

[Vol. 37:1

9
plaintiffs back to federal court where the restrictions of the PSLRA would apply.
Congress did not, however, preempt the substantive law of state securities fraud or
its remedies. Instead, it preempted state courts from adjudicating securities fraud class
actions.10 In preempting only class actions, Congress left state law to provide a cause of
action for securities fraud, albeit one that can only be pursued individually. SLUSA
preempts class actions:

based upon the statutory or common law of a State or subdivision thereof...
by any private party alleging (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.'I
Although the language is not identical, SLUSA's preemption language tracks
closely the general federal anti-fraud prohibition found in Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and the SEC's Rule lOb-5. 12 Rule lOb-5 is the
typical basis for federal securities class actions.
1. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit
MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit1 3 raised the question of the scope of
SLUSA's preemption. The case arose out of the securities analyst scandals of the early
2000s, in which the New York Attorney General and the SEC alleged that securities
analysis provided by the major investment banks was biased as a result of those banks'
conflict of interest. Essentially, the government alleged that the banks were hyping the
common stock of their investment banking clients to garner more investment banking
business. A host of private claims followed the government enforcement actions.
Plaintiffs asserted private claims in both federal securities class actions and arbitration
proceedings. The scandal also gave rise to the claim in Dabit: plaintiffs alleged that they
were induced to hold securities that they would have sold if the analyst research that they
relied upon had been accurate.14
Plaintiffs' complaint was a transparent attempt to evade SLUSA's restrictions, but it
gave rise to an interpretive difficulty. SLUSA preempts only claims that are "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security."1 5 Plaintiffs claimed that they
had not sold their securities. Moreover, the claim being asserted could not have been
raised under federal law. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme Court
held that plaintiffs must have sold or purchased securities in order to have standing under

9.

See SECURITIEs LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998, H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13

(1998) ("The purpose of this title is to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections that Federal law
provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather than in Federal, court.").
10. Securities Act of 1933 § 16(f)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A) (2006).
11. Securities Act of 1933 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § (10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
13. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
14. Id. at 75.
15. Securities Act of 1933 § 16(f)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)(A).
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Rule 10b-5.1 6 Would Blue Chip's narrow interpretation of "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security" undercut the preemptive force of SLUSA?
Ultimately, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, was forced to engage in judicial
"reimagination" of Congress's intent. No one seriously doubted that Congress, if it had
considered the question, would have preempted such claims. The point of SLUSA was to
protect issuers from meritless suits by funneling securities class actions into federal court.
In addition, the economic logic of holder claims is dubious at best. Allowing
compensation for holder claims would amount to a windfall: I would have sold if I had
known the truth! And the purchaser would not have known? Presumably Congress did
not anticipate the problem of holder suits because of the scant likelihood that any state
court would allow such claims. The Court notes that Congress had no occasion to
consider whether holder claims should be preempted at the time it adopted SLUSA:
"[t]he actual assertion of such claims by way of class action was virtually unheard of
before SLUSA was enacted."' 7 Notwithstanding the novelty of such claims, it was clear
to the Court that "[a] narrow reading of the statute would undercut the effectiveness of
the 1995 Reform Act and thus run counter to SLUSA's stated purpose, viz., 'to prevent
certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to
frustrate the objectives' of the [PSLRA]."l 8
Fortunately for the Court, it was able to rely on prior interpretations of Rule lOb-5
that had relaxed the purchase or sale requirement. The Court had previously interpreted
Rule 1Ob-5 to not require the allegation of a specific purchase or sale of a security-at
least in a government enforcement action. According to the Court, "[u]nder our
precedents, it is enough that the fraud alleged 'coincide' with a securities transactionwhether by the plaintiff or someone else." 19 Thus, the Court had two interpretations of
Rule lOb-5 that it could look to in interpreting the essentially identical language used by
Congress in SLUSA: first the construction of the private right of action, and second,
purporting to construe only Section 10(b)'s text, which applied only to government
actions. At first glance, one might have thought the interpretation used for the private
right of action was the most applicable; after all, the Court was addressing a private right
of action, albeit one arising under state law. The Court, however, chose the broader
interpretation of Section 10(b) in defining SLUSA's scope, and offered two reasons in
support of that interpretive choice.
Both of the Court's justifications are open to criticism. The first justification was
that the broader position was consistent with the SEC's longstanding interpretation. 2 0 Of
course, the SEC's interpretation arose out of government actions, so it is hard to see why
it should guide the Court's interpretive choice here. Second, the Court conjectured that
"Congress can hardly have been unaware of this broad construction adopted by both this
Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrase-'in connection with the purchase or
sale'-into SLUSA's core provision." 2 1 This conjecture is open to question-it seems to
16. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
17. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 86.
18. Id. (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub L. No. 105-353, § 2(5), 112
Stat. 3227, 3227 (1998)).
19. Id. at 85 (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)).
20. Id
21. Id.
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posit an ideal legislator who pays careful attention to judicial interpretations-but more
importantly, it does not answer the question of which interpretation Congress is presumed
to be aware of. Why not both? And why presume that Congress favored one over the
other? With two interpretations available, Stevens chose the one consistent with the
statute's obvious purpose. The inclusion of that purpose in the text of the statute nmeant
there would be no debates over how to read legislative intent, a topic that would arise in
later cases, since Congress enacted that intent in the statute. As a result, Stevens garnered
a unanimous Court for his opinion. 22
2. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust
The Court's second foray into SLUSA was almost unanimous, with only Justice
Scalia declining to join the majority opinion. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust called on
the Court to interpret SLUSA's removal provision. 23 SLUSA bolsters its preemptive
effect with the option of removal to federal court. 24 The provision is somewhat unusual
in that it allows for removal of actions so that they can be dismissed in federal court.
Ordinarily, one would expect the law to require the defendant to bring its motion to
dismiss or demurrer in state court. Indeed, SLUSA appears to strip the state court of
subject matter jurisdiction; ordinarily, preemption would require the state court to dismiss
the case.
The removal provision, however, serves two important federal interests: (1) it allows
federal courts to interpret the scope of preemption, thus enhancing uniformity; and (2) it
triggers the PSLRA's stay of discovery. SLUSA contains a number of exceptions to its
preemptive reach, so there is some federal interest in uniformity of interpretation. The
more pressing interest for defendants, however, is the ability to block discovery. Some
state court rules would allow discovery while a motion to dismiss was pending, thus
forcing the defendant to seek a discretionary stay from the state court or an injunction
against discovery from a federal court under SLUSA. 25 The same discovery could be
used, not only in the state court action, but also in a subsequent federal class action.
Removal allows the defendant to file a motion to dismiss in federal court which
automatically triggers the PSLRA's discovery stay. Thus, removal to federal court
protects issuers against the costs of "fishing expedition" discovery without limiting
discovery's availability in state courts.
This removal provision, however, raises the question of the appropriate response to
improperly removed cases, i.e., a case not within the scope of SLUSA's preemption. If a
party has erroneously removed a non-preempted action to federal court, SLUSA allows
the federal court to remand the action to state court. 26 In Kircher, the district court

22. Justice Alito did not participate, having joined the Court after oral argument.
23. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
24. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2006); Securities Act of 1933 §16(c), 15
U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2006) ("Any class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set forth
in subsection (b), shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending,
and shall be subject to subsection (b).").
25. The injunction against discovery may or may not be available, depending on whether a parallel action
has been filed in federal court.
26. Securities Act of 1933 §16(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4) (2006).
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remanded the case to state court after determining that it lacked jurisdiction. 27
Defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which held that SLUSA precluded the
claims.28

To reach that conclusion, however, the Seventh Circuit first had to determine that it
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. This question was complicated by Title 28, Section
1447(d) of the United States Code, which bars appellate review of district court orders
remanding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held the question
of preclusion to be distinct from the question of jurisdiction, and therefore reviewable on
appeal. 29
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the Court had "relentlessly repeated" that
remand orders are not subject to appellate review. 30 That consistent approach meant
"Congress is aware of the universality of th[e] practice of denying appellate review of
remand orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal." 3 1 The Court found no
"clear statutory command" in SLUSA to overcome that presumption. 32 The Court read
the statute's removal provision as coextensive with its preclusion provision: "Once
removal jurisdiction under subsection (c) is understood to be restricted to precluded
actions defined by subsection (b), a motion to remand claiming the action is not
precluded must be seen as posing a jurisdictional issue." 33 If the issue is not precluded,
then the court has no jurisdiction. Consequently, the district court's remand order was not
subject to review in the court of appeals. Moreover, federal courts do not possess
exclusive authority to address the question of preclusion; the Court read the statute as
allowing the defendant to seek dismissal in state court without first removing to federal
court. 34 Few defendants will opt to do this, but it does mean that the state court will have
jurisdiction to dismiss a preempted claim.
The only aspect of the case that generated any dispute among the Justices was the
question of what was needed to trigger the rule of no appellate review. Justice Scalia
wrote a concurrence to offer his view that it did not matter whether the remand was based
on lack of jurisdiction or not. 35 As long as the district court stated that the remand was
based on lack of jurisdiction, that sufficed to invoke the rule of no appellate review. 36
The interpretation of SLUSA was unimportant for Scalia; what mattered was the
enforcement of the rule of no appellate review for remand orders.
The Justices were in unanimous agreement that there is nothing special-nothing
inherently federal-about SLUSA. SLUSA is a federal law that preempts certain state
court actions, but either federal or state courts can apply it. The ordinary rules of
appellate (non)review apply. No Justice on the Court saw any value in having federal
27. The district court's decision, which is based on the fact that plaintiff had not purchased or sold
securities, preceded the Court's Dabit decision rejecting that interpretation of SLUSA's preemptive language.
Kircher, 547 U.S. at 638 n.5.
28. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478,484 (7th Cir. 2005).
29. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2004).
30. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 640-41 n.8.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 641 n.8.
33. Id. at 643-44.
34. Id. at 646.
35. Kircher,547 U.S. at 648.
36. Id. at 649-50.
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courts as the exclusive interpreters of SLUSA's reach, and no Justice mentioned the need
to enforce the discovery stay as a justification for keeping the case in the federal courts
until the question of preemption was resolved. The Court focused on its jurisprudence
relating to remand orders, not the task of implementing SLUSA to craft a coherent
federal securities class action regime.
B. Statute ofLimitations
The statute of limitations in Rule lOb-5 cases has a somewhat convoluted history.
Given that the judiciary created the Rule lOb-5 cause of action, rather than Congress, it is
no surprise that Congress did not specify a limitations period for Section 10(b) when it
passed the Exchange Act in 1934. Filling this gap, the Court borrowed the Exchange Act
provision applicable to securities price manipulation claims, 37 which requires that suits
be brought "within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and
within three years after such violation." 38 Congress claimed the issue for itself, however,
when it passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, extending the limitations period for
Section 10(b) actions to "2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the
violation" or "5 years after such violation." 39
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds called on the Roberts Court to interpret both "discovery"
and "facts constituting the violation" as this provision provided. 40 On the first point, the
Court had to resolve the uncertainty over whether discovery required actual discovery of
the facts by the plaintiff or whether it should extend to facts that a "reasonably diligent
plaintiff would have discovered." 4 1 On its face, this would not seem to be much of an
issue, as the parties (and the Solicitor General) agreed that the latter interpretation was
correct. 42 Justice Breyer, however, addressed the issue at length, purportedly "because
we cannot answer the question presented without considering whether the parties are
right about this matter." 4 3 The more plausible explanation, however, is that Justice Scalia
(joined by Justice Thomas) wrote separately to argue that discovery meant discovery by
the actual plaintiff in the case.44
The Justices disagreed on the meaning of discovery because of their differing
approaches to statutory interpretation. For Breyer and the majority, the reasonably
diligent discovery standard made sense because lower courts had followed that approach
prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 45 "We normally assume that, when
Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent." 46 Congress had
codified that precedent.
Scalia rejected the majority's approach:

37. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(f) (2006).
39. Sarbanes--Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (2002) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006)).
40. Merck& Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1799 (2010).
41. Id. at 1793.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id at 1800 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1795.
46. Id.
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Assuming that Congress intended to incorporate the Circuits' views[-]which
requires the further unrealistic assumption that a majority of each House knew
of and agreed with the Courts of Appeals' opinions[-]that would be entirely
irrelevant. Congress's collective intent (if such a thing even exists) cannot
trump the text it enacts, and in any event we have no reliable way to ascertain
47
that intent apart from reading the text.
Scalia's preferred approach: locate the statute of limitations adopted by Congress in
the overall statutory scheme. Included in this scheme, in Scalia's view, were not only the
other provisions of the Exchange Act, but also the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act). Bringing the Securities Act into the picture changes the analysis because that law
includes an explicit constructive discovery provision in Section 13. The limitations period
begins to run "after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such
discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence." 4 8 For Scalia,
Congress's inclusion of a constructive discovery provision in the Securities Act's statute
of limitations meant that its omission in the analogous provision of the Exchange Act
must be given legal effect, i.e., constructive discovery would not trigger the statute of
49
limitations period under the Exchange Act.
One might label Breyer's approach to statutory interpretation "judicial centric" and
Scalia's "textual centric." Breyer's approach can be criticized for making heroic
assumptions about the average legislator's familiarity with the judicial precedents in a
given area. If the goal is to further legislative intent, Breyer's postulated intent seems
largely fictional. Worse yet, Breyer does not consistently take the approach throughout
the opinion. Confronted with the question of whether "inquiry notice" suffices to begin
the running of the statute of limitations, Breyer downplays the importance of lower court
decisions adopting that standard because "[w]e cannot reconcile it with the statute, which
simply provides that 'discovery' is the event that triggers the 2-year limitations periodfor all plaintiffs." 50 Now he's a textualist? Sometimes the text controls, and sometimes
prior judicial interpretation controls. Breyer leaves us to guess when to apply which
standard.
Scalia candidly concedes that he is uninterested in legislative intent, only in
legislative enactments. His textual approach can be criticized for being unrealistic in its
assumptions about the competence of legislators to fit together statutory provisions into a
coherent whole. The problem becomes more acute when, as is the case with the securities
laws, provisions are adopted by different Congresses. In this case, the statute of
limitations adopted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act came almost 70 years after the
Securities Act. Expecting consistency across that long a period may simply be wishful
thinking on Justice Scalia's part.
A more fundamental criticism of Justice Scalia's approach is that it ignores the
reality of securities class action practice. If the actual plaintiff must "discover . .. the
47. Id. at 1802 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2006).
49. Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1800 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("To interpret § 1658(b)(1) as imposing a
constructive-discovery standard, one must therefore assume, contrary to common sense, that the same word
means two very different things in the same statutory context of limitations periods for securities-fraud actions
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.").
50. Id. at 1798.
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facts" to begin the tolling of the statute of limitations, it is hardly a challenge for an
enterprising plaintiffs' attorney to search out plaintiffs until he has found one who has not
yet discovered the facts. Scalia's approach would render the Exchange Act's statute of
limitations a nullity for securities class actions, 5 1 leaving only the five-year statute of
repose. Even the plaintiffs did not endorse Scalia's approach. What is surprising is that
Breyer did not call Scalia on this point. Neither side of the dispute seems interested inor perhaps aware of-the actual practice of securities litigation, in which plaintiffs are
largely figureheads.
The second question at issue in the case-what are the "facts constituting the
violation"-provoked no disagreement. The Court's holding on this point-that scienter
is one of the facts constituting the violation 52-is unremarkable. Breyer's discussion is
notable only in that it invokes the pleading standard from the PSLRA to help interpret the
statute of limitations. 53 The PSLRA's pleading standard requires the plaintiff to plead
facts supporting scienter in the complaint. 54 On this issue, Breyer harmonized the
different amendments to the Exchange Act, even though they were enacted by different
Congresses. He saw no need, however, to harmonize the Exchange Act's statute of
limitations with the one found in the Securities Act. Statutory context apparently matters
more within a particular statute than it does across the securities laws as a whole.
C. Statutory Interpretationand the Securities Laws
One common thread running through these three cases is the predominance of
theories of statutory interpretation over the impact of those interpretations on actual
practice. This approach suggests a somewhat confined vision of the judicial role; only
certain sources matter. In Kircher and Merck, the approach to statutory interpretation
focused on judicial precedent. Congress was presumed to have incorporated those judicial
interpretations into its legislation. Whether any member of Congress was actually aware
of that precedent, we do not know. In Dabit, the Court confronted two potentially
relevant interpretive strands with the Court asserting that Congress was legislating
against the backdrop of one strand rather than the other. The Court adopted the
interpretive choice that it did because, the purpose of the statute-to prevent evasion of
the PSLRA-was clear from the statute's face. The judicial precedent mattered little to
the decision, but the Court nonetheless invoked it, despite its lack of persuasive force.
The common thread here is that the Court is managing the relationship between
itself and Congress. In not one of the three cases does the Court demonstrate any
awareness-or interest-in the actual practice of securities litigation. It is primarily
interested in applying its precedents in a predictable fashion. Whether it succeeds in this
task is open to question, but the enterprise is a general one, not specific to the securities
law.

51.
52.
53.
54.

It would still play a role, however, in individual actions.
Merck, 130 S. Ct. at 1796.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

During the New Deal, the securities laws were a critical proving ground for the
Supreme Court in developing the judiciary's approach to the fledgling administrative
state. 55 Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his Administration faced a number of legal
challenges to their efforts to tame the financial markets. Most prominent was a decade
long war over the SEC's efforts to dismantle the giant public utility conglomerates under
56
the authority granted by the Public Utility Holding Company Act. The bottom line that
emerged from those cases was that the Court was going to defer to the administrative
state; the expertise of the SEC was a bedrock belief among the New Deal alumni that
Roosevelt appointed to the Supreme Court. 57 That deference translated into a stellar
58
win/loss record for the SEC; the agency rarely came up short in its first four decades.
The Roberts Court has been less deferential than the New Deal Court. It has decided
two cases implicating the role of the securities laws in the administrative state, and in
both cases, the Court rejected the government's position. These results would suggest
skepticism toward the government's claims of expertise, but the Roberts Court's real
skepticism appears aimed at the case law that it has inherited from earlier Courts.
A. Antitrust v. SecuritiesRegulation
The Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile the antitrust and securities laws. The
antitrust laws are premised on the benefits that free competition brings to the economy:
lower price and greater choice, both presumed to enhance consumer welfare. The
securities laws, like most regulatory schemes, create barriers to entry that invite
anticompetitive behavior. The SEC's tolerance of price fixing of commissions by broker59
dealers during the first 40 years of its existence is the most notorious example.
The Court has rarely waded into the conflict between these two regulatory regimes;
it has struggled when it has done so. The Court's struggles can be traced to a bad start by
60
the Warren Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. Silver was a broker-dealer, not
a member of the New York Stock Exchange, who had his wire connection to a number of
61
other broker-dealers terminated at the order of the New York Stock Exchange. Silver
brought suit against the exchange, alleging that the termination of his connection was a
2
collective refusal to deal that violated the Sherman Act. 6 The Second Circuit held that
the claim was barred because the Exchange was exercising powers it held under the
Exchange Act, which had impliedly repealed the antitrust laws with respect to those
55. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 1, at 872-92 (analyzing the Supreme Court cases shortly after
the New Deal).
56. Public Utility Holding Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (repealed 2005).
57. See Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 1, at 894-912 (discussing the Supreme Court's deference to
the SEC expertise in cases shortly after the New Deal).
58. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and PrivateLaw: The Vanishing
Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1579-86 (2004) (describing the Supreme Court's
expansive holdings in all but a handful of securities cases until 1973).
59. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (holding that the SEC's system
of fixed commission rules is outside the scope of the antitrust laws).
60. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 343-44 (1963).
61. Id. at 344.
62. Id at 345.
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powers. 63
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Second Circuit had erred in
excluding the antitrust laws altogether: "The proper approach . . . is an analysis which

reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding
one completely ousted." 64 The Court then went on to reconcile the two schemes by
turning to. . . due process? The Court held that the antitrust laws had been violated
because the exchange had not afforded the broker-dealer notice and hearing before
terminating his wire connection. 65 The Court's injection of due process into antitrust was
summarily dismantled by Justice Stewart in his dissent, 66 and has baffled both securities
and antitrust lawyers since it was handed down.
The Court has not overruled Silver, but the Burger Court worked hard to narrow its
reach. In two cases decided the same day, the Court rejected antitrust claims against
participants in the securities industry. Notably, in both cases the United States and the
SEC, as amici, supported opposing sides. The first, United States v. NationalAssociation

of Securities Dealers (NASD), involved resale practices in the mutual fund industry. 6 7
The second, Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, involved the fixed brokerage
commissions mentioned above. 6 8
The Court concluded that the practices in both cases were immune from antitrust
scrutiny, but only after painstaking review of the SEC's involvement in the challenged
practice. In the NASD case, Justice Powell reviewed the SEC's involvement in mutual
fund pricing under the Investment Company Act at length before concluding,
"Maintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly related to the SEC's
responsibilities poses a substantial danger that [the mutual fund managers] would be
subjected to duplicative and inconsistent standards." 69 In Gordon, Justice Blackmun
conducted an equivalent review of the SEC's involvement in brokerage commissions,
concluding that Congress intended "to leave the supervision of the fixing of reasonable
rates of commission to the SEC." 70 These decisions purported to leave intact Silver's
governing principle that "[r]epeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make
the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary." 7 1 Silver survived because the Court saw the minimum repeal "necessary" as
quite broad.
The Court's unwillingness to overrule Silver left the door open for the claim in
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing.72 This case arose out of the "laddering"
scandals of 2001-02, in which it was alleged that underwriters, by promising allocations
of shares in "hot" initial public offerings, extracted promises from institutional investors
to purchase securities in the secondary market at inflated prices and/or with inflated
63.
64.
65.
66.
depends
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1963).
Silver, 373 U.S at 357.
Id. at 361-62.
See id. at 367, 370 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Whether there has been a violation of the antitrust laws
not at all upon whether or not the defendants' conduct was arbitrary.").
United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. (NASD), 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
NASD, 422 U.S. at 735.
Gordon, 422 U.S. at 691.
Silver, 373 U.S. at 357.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
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commissions. 73 The twist in Credit Suisse was that at least some of the conduct alleged,
if proven, violated the securities laws as well as the antitrust laws. 74 In fact, another
group of plaintiffs brought a parallel securities class action, alleging essentially the same
facts, resulting in a substantial settlement.7 5 The plaintiffs in Credit Suisse reasoned that
if the conduct violated both the antitrust and the securities laws, then there was no
inconsistency between the two regimes, making no repeal of the antitrust laws necessary.
As in Gordon and NASD, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the SEC
were on opposing sides in the lower courts. In those earlier cases, the Solicitor General
authorized the SEC to file its own brief in the Supreme Court. In Credit Suisse, however,
the Solicitor General attempted to cobble together a compromise position. He argued the
case should be remanded to the district court to determine "whether respondents'
allegations of prohibited conduct can, as a practical matter, be separated from conduct
that is permitted by the regulatory scheme." 76 That task would require the lower court to
decide whether SEC-permitted and SEC-prohibited conduct are "inextricably
intertwined." 77
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected both the plaintiffs' and Solicitor
General's arguments. He discerned "only a fine, complex, detailed line separat[ing]
activity that the SEC permits or encourages (for which [plaintiffs] must concede antitrust
immunity) from activity that the SEC must (and inevitably will) forbid (and which, on
[plaintiffs'] theory, should be open to antitrust attack)." 7 8 The Court worried that only a
"securities expert" could locate this line, and even then, the SEC might shift it by
deciding that previously forbidden conduct was now permissible. 79 Moreover, Breyer
worried that the "nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary to separate the
permissible from the impermissible" would lead to inconsistent verdicts in the hands of
"different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries." 80 The unpredictability of
such an arrangement for market participants is obvious. Rather than disrupting the
scheme of securities regulation, the Court concluded that it should entirely exclude
antitrust claims. Credit Suisse does not explicitly overrule Silver, but Credit Suisse steps
back sharply from Silver's exertions in preserving a role for antitrust. In Credit Suisse,
Breyer leaves little doubt that Silver need not be taken seriously. Securities regulation is
sufficiently pervasive that antitrust claims will ordinarily be barred.
Justice Thomas dissented, pointing to the savings clause found in the Exchange Act,
which preserves "any and all" "rights and remedies." 8 1 For Thomas, "[w]hen Congress
wants to preserve all other remedies, using the word 'all' is sufficient." 82 If adopted,
Thomas's position would open the door to a myriad of antitrust claims challenging
73. Id. at 269-70.
74. Id. at 278-79.
75. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467, 480-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (approving $586
million settlement).
76. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur
at 9, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (No. 05-1157), 2007 WL 173649).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 279.
79. Id. at 280.
80. Id. at 281.
81. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006).
82. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 287, 289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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practices sanctioned by the securities laws. In Merck, Scalia put forth literalism of this
sort and the majority rejected it. The results in Credit Suisse and Merck suggest that
textualism has a limited following in the Court.
CreditSuisse's general theme is judicial modesty; the Court lacks confidence in the
ability of judges to understand the complexity of the securities markets. This judicial
modesty, however, does not translate into judicial deference to the executive branch. The
Court was unimpressed with the Solicitor General's effort at compromise; his
"inextricably intertwined" principle failed to address the line-drawing difficulties that the
Court had found. The Court was unwilling to defer to the government's effort to push it
(and lower courts) into resolving complicated disputes over competing regulatory
paradigms.
B. Separation ofPowers
The Roberts Court's other foray into the intersection of administrative law and
securities law-Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB)83-is notable in that it has almost nothing to do with the securities laws:
neither the majority nor the dissenters grapple with the decision's implications for the
regulation of accounting. PCAOB nominally involves the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but it is
mainly a constitutional separation of powers case. At issue was the provision of that law
making PCAOB board members removable only by the SEC, and then only "for good
cause shown." 84 This provision was challenged as violating the separation of powers
because it deprived the President of meaningful oversight over officers exercising
executive authority. 85 The Chief Justice, for the majority, wrote a lengthy opinion
surveying the Court's prior decisions involving "for cause" restrictions, which were
upheld by the New Deal Court in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.8 6 The tenor of
his discussion of those prior precedents is at best grudging, but he eventually concludes
that some restrictions on the President's removal authority are permissible. 87 The double
"for cause" removal provision at issue in PCAOB, however, was too much. 8 In a
similarly lengthy opinion (with Appendix!), Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, concluded that the majority was "wrong-very wrong." 89
For the average securities lawyer, the only thing of interest in the opinions is that the
Court found that the unconstitutional "for cause" provision was severable from the
remainder of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 90 The question of severability was the only topic

83. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
84. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(e)(6), 116 Stat. 745, 752 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(e)(6) (2010)). A second issue was raised in the case regarding the appointment of
the PCAOB members by the SEC, but the Court rejected the argument summarily. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 316264.
85. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.
86. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
87. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3152-53.
88. Id. at 3164 ("While we have sustained in certain cases limits on the President's removal power, the
Act before us imposes a new type of restriction-two levels of protection from removal for those who
nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President's authority in this way.").
89. Id. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 3161-62.
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that created any drama; the Court's holding meant that the decision was largely a nonevent for the practice of securities law because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was left
generally intact. Whether the members of the PCAOB are removable or not is unlikely to
make much of a difference for the day-to-day practice of accounting regulation.
For the scholar of securities law, the opinion is notable both for what it includes and
what it omits. The notable inclusion is the Court's assumption that the members of the
SEC are removable only "for cause," despite the lack of a textual basis for that
conclusion. 9 1 As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent, the majority stretches to create a
constitutional question by reading a "for cause" provision for the removal of SEC
Commissioners into the Exchange Act. 92 If the Court had instead read the Exchange Act
to allow the President to remove SEC Commissioners at will, the Court could have
93
avoided the novel constitutional question of double "for cause" removal. Why did the
Court depart from its usual practice of construing statutes to avoid constitutional
questions? If one reads the majority's opinion, the most reasonable conclusion to draw
from its arguments is that restrictions on the President's power to remove the SEC
commissioners violate the separation of powers. The holding, however, targets the new
kid in town, the PCAOB. The SEC's status in the pantheon of regulatory agencies is
apparently so secure that it is unthinkable for the Court to question its independence,
notwithstanding the absence of a "for cause" provision in the text of the Exchange Act.
The notable omission from the opinion is any discussion of Congress's goals in
insulating the members of the PCAOB from removal. The omission is telling. Congress
was not concerned about presidential interference with the Board's operations; the real
threat was from Congress itself. Politics abhors a vacuum of governmental authority. By
insulating the SEC from the President's removal authority, Congress made the SEC not
independent, but rather, dependent on Congress. 94 That dependence allowed Congress to
95
strong arm the SEC on the question of auditor independence. When Arthur Andersen
collapsed in the wake of the Enron scandal, the accounting firm's substantial revenue
stream from consulting for Enron was diagnosed as the principal cause. Faced with a
flurry of embarrassing headlines, Congress quickly got religious on the question of
auditor independence. That newfound fervor found its expression in the independence
conferred on the PCAOB, which was insulated both from the President and Congress, in
the hope that it would protect accounting regulation from political interference.
None of this history is covered in the Court's opinion, which blinks reality by
96
asserting that, "one branch's handicap is another's strength." This point applies to the
"for cause" removal requirement for the SEC, but has much less force when applied to
the PCAOB. Moreover, the dissent fails to challenge the majority on its skewed

91. Id. at 3148-49 ("The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the
President except under the Humphrey's Executor standard of 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office."') (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 620)).
92. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1073 (2005)
(explaining how Congress made the SEC dependent upon them).
95. Interview with Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, SEC, Frontline (Mar. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/regulation/interviews/levitt.html.
96. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. at 3156.
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understanding of the balance of power between Congress and the President. This
omission by both sides of any discussion of the rationale for the PCAOB's independence
might be taken as further evidence of the gap between the Court's securities
jurisprudence and the political economy of securities regulation. In fairness to the Court,
however, it is difficult to sound judicial while discussing interest group pressures on
Congress and their influence on accounting policy. Do the Justices really want to
introduce the question of campaign contributions into separation of powers
jurisprudence? That said, the Court's decision restores some of the influence that
Congress previously held over the accounting profession. Any benefit to Presidential
oversight from the Court's striking down the PCAOB's "for cause" provision seems de
minimis by comparison.
C. Securities Laws and the Administrative State
Credit Suisse and PCAOB reflect efforts by the Roberts Court to limit prior
precedents that it considers misguided. Credit Suisse cabins the confused Silver decision,
which conflates antitrust and due process. PCAOB limits Humphrey's Executor's attempt
to insulate expert agencies from political interference. Both lines of precedent have
implications that go well beyond the administration of the securities laws. The opinions
in Credit Suisse and PCAOB are directed at those debates, paying scant attention to the
substance of the securities laws.
IV. THE CLASS ACTION MENACE?
The Roberts Court has been busy with securities class actions, deciding substantive
issues in seven cases during the Chief Justice's first six years. On the nominal scorecard,
plaintiffs have won three of those cases, and the defendants the other four. A closer look
at those decisions, however, suggests more balance; informed observers would probably
flip the tally closer to four to three. 97 The Roberts Court has consistently overturned
lower court decisions that would have curtailed the existing availability of securities class
actions. Plaintiffs have been rebuffed, however, when they attempted to expand the
boundaries of private litigation, particularly when it comes to secondary liability.
A. JudicialGatekeeping: The PleadingStandard,Materiality,and Class Certification
1. PleadingScienter
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.9 8 interprets the PSLRA's "strong
inference" standard for pleading scienter-the defendants' state of mind-in Rule 1Ob-5
cases. 99 After the enactment of the PSLRA, the circuits diverged in applying the strong
inference standard. The Second Circuit relied on the legislative history and held that the
PSLRA codified its pre-PSLRA pleading approach based on motive and opportunity and

97. If one were to include Merck (plaintiff win) and Dabit (defendant win) in this tally, the numbers
would change to five to four in favor of the plaintiffs.
98. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
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on recklessness. 10 0 The Ninth Circuit also relied on the PSLRA's legislative history, but
101
Under
concluded that the statute raised the standard above that of the Second Circuit.
the higher Ninth Circuit pleading standard, plaintiffs had to plead, "at a minimum,
particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious
recklessness." 1 02 Most circuits, however, took a middle course, concluding that motive
and opportunity allegations might suffice to support a strong inference of scienter, but
courts would need to evaluate such allegations on a "case-by-case" basis. 103
When the Supreme Court finally entered the fray in Tellabs over the interpretation
of the strong inference standard, it did not resolve this longstanding split among the
circuits over the application of the standard, which most observers had been expecting.
Instead, it addressed a collateral, but related, issue on which the circuits had also split: in
considering whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff meet the strong inference standard,
how should courts assess the different possible inferences that might be drawn from the
allegations in the complaint with respect to scienter? In particular, should a court consider
competing inferences arising from those facts?
Prior to the Supreme Court's Tellabs opinion, the circuit courts split into three
groups in assessing competing inferences. The First, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
adopted a "preponderance" standard. 104 The preponderance standard requires the
inference that the defendants had the requisite scienter be the most plausible when
compared with competing inferences that the defendants did not have scienter. 105
Combined with the Ninth Circuit's higher deliberate or conscious recklessness scienter
standard, this standard made it easier for defendants in the Ninth Circuit to obtain
dismissal. The Second, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits required that the inference
that the defendants acted with the requisite scienter be at least equally plausible with
competing inferences. 10 6 Finally, the Third and Seventh Circuits followed the most
plaintiff-friendly approach, adopting the "reasonableness" standard that did not require
100. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2000).
101. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the PSLRA
as requiring a higher pleading standard than that found in Second Circuit decisions).
102. Id.
103. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999); Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc.,
353 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Comshare, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir.
2006); Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Silicon Graphics,
183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (demonstrating the middle course approach).
The choice of scienter standard has important consequences: the Ninth Circuit, in adopting the most
stringent standard post-PSLRA, also substantially increased its dismissal rate. An earlier study found that Ninth
Circuit courts dismissed cases at a 63% rate, while Second Circuit courts dismissed only 36%. See A.C.
Pritchard & Hillary Sale, What Counts as Fraud?An EmpiricalStudy of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPtRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125 (2005) (demonstrating the increased
dismissal rate).
104. In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2005); Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic
Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2003); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001); Gompper v.
VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002).
105. E.g., Gompper, 298 F.3d at 896-97.
106. Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854
(5th Cir. 2003); Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001); Pirraglia v.
Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255 (1lth Cir. 2006).
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any assessment of competing inferences, looking only at the plausibility of the plaintiffs
allegations.' 0 7 Under the Seventh Circuit's reasonableness standard as set forth in Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. (the lower court opinion before the Supreme Court
in Tellabs), a complaint should survive "if it alleges facts from which, if true, a
reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent."10 8
The Seventh Circuit standard faced an uphill fight in the Supreme Court. The
government's Tellabs amicus brief argues that the Seventh Circuit's reasonableness
standard would have made Congress's effort in enacting the strong inference standard
toothless, as it would mean reverting to pre-PSLRA standards under Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 109
The government's brief is notable in that it sides with the defendants, an unusual
occurrence in its amicus practice.110 The SEC has historically sided with the plaintiffs'
bar,' 11 and even minor deviations from that role bring a firestorm of criticism from the
plaintiffs' bar and its allies. 112 The SEC's support for the plaintiffs' bar in part reflects its
own institutional interests. The agency favors broad interpretations of its governing
statutes; a narrow interpretation of Section 10(b) could reduce the SEC's enforcement
discretion. The agency commonly sides with the plaintiffs' bar, however, even on issues
that relate purely to the terms of the implied Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action.1 13 So here the
Court faced the unusual scenario of the government siding with the defendants.
The Court was unmoved by this unusual alignment. Ginsberg characterized her role
as framing "a workable construction of the 'strong inference' standard, a reading geared
to the PSLRAs twin goals: to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors' ability to recover on meritorious claims."ll 4 Having framed the inquiry in this
way, it is no surprise that Ginsberg settled on the intermediate position. She rejected the
reasonableness standard adopted by the lower court, instead requiring a comparative
inquiry: "A complaint will survive, we hold, only if a reasonable person would deem the
inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one

107. In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2006).
108. Tellabs, 437 F.3d at 602.
109. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 23, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (No. 06-484), 2007 WL 460606 (arguing that "the court of appeals'
standard appears to be equivalent to the standard that it (and some other courts of appeals) had applied before
the enactment of the Reform Act, under which a complaint was sufficient if the plaintiff pleaded facts that
supported at least a reasonableinference of state of mind").
110. See id. at 26 (arguing that "if the alleged facts give rise to two seemingly equally strong competing
inferences, a court must conclude that the inference of scienter is not itself strong") (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
111. See Pritchard,supra note 2, at 923 (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., complaining that "SEC
usually favors all n. I can't recall a case in which this was not so.").
112. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at Cl
(presenting criticism of SEC actions to protect corporations from lawsuits); Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C.
ChangingCourse?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at Cl (outlining indications that the chairman of the SEC may be
siding more with business interests and less with investors). Labaton is the son of a prominent plaintiffs'
lawyer, Ed Labaton.
113. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopting SEC's recommendation of the fraud
on the market presumption of reliance for securities fraud class actions).
114. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
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could draw from the facts alleged."1 15 Congress's use of the word "strong" compelled
that conclusion. According to Ginsberg, "The strength of an inference cannot be decided
in a vacuum. The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it that one conclusion,
as compared to others, follows from the underlying facts?" 116 At a minimum, therefore,
the Court felt compelled to choose the intermediate "equal inference" standard, rejecting
"reasonableness." Ties are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, but the plaintiff must show
that the fraudulent inference is at least as likely as an innocent one.
The Court rejected the "preponderance" standard favored by the defendants and the
government, which won the support of Justices Scalia and Alito in their concurrences. 117
Scalia gets points for his colorful illustration of his disagreement with Ginsberg:
If a jade falcon were stolen from a room to which only A and B had access,
could it possibly be said there was a "strong inference" that B was the thief? I
think not, and I therefore think that the Court's test must fail. In my view, the
test should be whether the inference of scienter (if any) is more plausible than
the inference of innocence. 118
This provoked the predictable exchange between Scalia and Ginsberg over the
analogy, and more fundamentally, the "meaning" of the word strong.1 19 Scalia also
engaged in a familiar debate with both the majority and Stevens (who dissented) over the
appropriate approach to statutory interpretation generally, complete with the standard
Scalia complaint about the use of legislative history.120 Stevens' free-wheeling approach
to statutory interpretation particularly provoked Scalia. For Scalia, such discretion is
"conferred upon administrative agencies, which need not adopt what courts would
consider the interpretation most faithful to the text of the statute, but may choose some
other interpretation, so long as it is within the bounds of the reasonable." 1 21 Courts "must
apply judgment, to be sure. But judgment is not discretion." 1 22
Stevens shot back that "[t]he meaning of a statute can only be determined on a caseby-case basis and will, in each case, turn differently on the clarity of the statutory
language, its context, and the intent of its drafters."l 23 Stevens preferred a "probable
cause" standard because "it is a concept that is familiar to judges," and "[a]s a matter of
normal English usage, its meaning is roughly the same as 'strong inference."' 1 24 It is
unclear who normally uses "probable cause" at all, other than criminal defense lawyers
and prosecutors. Stevens, however, made no pretense: Congress intended "probable
cause" in adopting the "strong inference" phrasing. 125 Suffice it to say, none of the

115. Id at 324.
116. Id. at 323.
117. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 331 (Alito, J., concurring).
118. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 331-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Even if I agreed with the Court's interpretation of 'strong
inference,' I would not join the Court's opinion because of its frequent indulgence in the last remaining legal
fiction of the West: that the report of a single committee of a single House expresses the will of Congress.").
121. Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 335, 336 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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participants in this intramural debate persuaded the others.
In fairness to the Justices, it is not altogether clear that much of anything was at
stake once the implausible "reasonableness" standard was rejected. Is there much
difference between the equal inference and preponderance standards? In theory, the two
differ only when the competing inferences are tied. The equal inference standard awards
ties to the plaintiffs, leading to a rejection of the defendants' motion to dismiss on
scienter grounds; the preponderance standard awards ties to the defendants, leading to a
dismissal. As Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the difference between the equal
inference and preponderance standards is likely to be determinative in only a small
1 26
fraction of cases: "How often is it that inferences are precisely in equipoise?"
Given the limited change to the law Tellabs affected in most circuits, would it make
any difference to outcomes? It turns out that it does. Steve Choi and I, in a study
comparing motions to dismiss based on the pleading standard before and after Tellabs,
found that dismissals declined sharply in the Ninth Circuit after Tellabs, and that the
incidence of nuisance settlements climbed in that circuit. 127 The Justices were debating
amongst themselves the proper approach to statutory interpretation; their somewhat
theoretical debate had real consequences for litigants. That observation, however, is
possible only in hindsight.
2. Materiality
The scienter standard is the most common basis for challenging securities fraud
complaints.128 Materiality is also popular, however, with the issue showing up in nearly a
quarter of decisions resolving motions to dismiss. 129 A recurring complaint from
corporate executives and their lawyers is that the open-ended standard the Supreme Court
adopted made materiality determinations unnecessarily difficult: "[A] substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."1 30
Their prayers for more bright-line rules for materiality fell on deaf ears in Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.13 1 Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court,
rejected the argument that materiality should require a finding of statistical significance
for questions relating to drug safety. 132 The specific issue the case presented was whether
reports of adverse drug reactions to a pharmaceutical companies' top-selling product
could be material before the number of those reports reached a statistically significant
level. 13 3 The Court had no difficulty concluding that statistical significance was not a

126. Id. at 331 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court'sImpact on Securities Class Actions: An
EmpiricalAssessment of Tellabs, 28 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2012) (studying Tellabs' impact on the
Ninth Circuit), availableat http://jleo.oxfordjoumals.org/content/early/2011/08/25/jleo.ewrOl4.fuIll.pdf+html.
128. Id. at Thl. 3.
129. Id.
130. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Supreme Court adopted this
standard for Rule lOb-5 cases in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
131. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
132. Id. at 1321-23.
133. Id. at 1314.
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pre-requisite, noting that the FDA and other experts commonly made decisions in the
absence of statistically significant data, relying on other evidence of causation. 134 Once
again, the Court insisted that materiality was a "fact-specific inquiry . . . ."135 Any
alternative standard is necessarily either under or over inclusive, but those responsible for
making disclosure decisions have to face the fact that they will only know in hindsight
that they have guessed right. The only consolation the Court offered to those responsible
for making a materiality determination was the Court's reiteration that there was no
general duty to speak: "Even with respect to information that a reasonable investor might
consider material, companies can control what they have to disclose ... by controlling
what they say to the market." 1 36 Unless they have a 10-K or 10-Q to file next week.
Matrixx broke no new ground for plaintiffs, but they certainly didn't lose any either.
3. Class Certification
If the motion to dismiss is the principal tool for weeding out securities fraud class
actions, class certification comes second in importance. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co. 137 resolved a circuit split over the question of what a plaintiff was
required to prove to certify a class. The Fifth Circuit stood alone in requiring plaintiffs to
prove loss causation at the class certification stage, 138 which had proved a challenging
barrier for plaintiffs in that circuit. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court,
made short work of reversing the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit had held that plaintiffs
were required to prove loss causation in order to trigger the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson. 139 The Chief Justice, however, found that the
fraud-on-the market presumption had no connection to loss causation; the presumption
was about reliance, not loss causation.
The fact that a subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other than the
revelation of a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor
relied on the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or
presumptively through the fraud-on-the-market theory. Loss causation has no
logical connection to the facts necessary to establish the efficient market
140
predicate to the fraud-on-the-market theory.
It is hard to see Halliburton as anything more than mere error correction. But the
case does demonstrate a willingness by the Roberts Court to take securities cases to rein
in circuits imposing undue burdens on plaintiffs. Halliburtonis hardly a case that called
out for resolution; one circuit, not a terribly significant one for securities class actions,
had made an obvious mistake. The Supreme Court could have left the issue to percolate
in the lower courts with the hope that the deviant court of appeals would bring itself into

134. Id. at 1320.
135. Id. at 1321 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 232).
136. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1322.
137. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
138. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008) (expunging the
requirement that investors prove loss causation at class certification stage); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679,
687 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 636-37 (3d Cir. 2011) (same).
139. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
140. Halliburton,131 S. Ct. at 2186.
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line with the other circuits. Instead, the Court invested the time to bring the Fifth Circuit
into line when it imposed an unwarranted burden on plaintiffs. If the Roberts Court has a
"pro-business" agenda, its selection of cases for review seems poorly suited for
promoting its aims.
B. Mutual Fund Litigation
A less prominent feature of the Court's securities jurisprudence is the regulation of
mutual funds under the Investment Company Act of 1940.141 Jones v. HarrisAssociates
LPl42 came to the Court from the Seventh Circuit. The dispute over the case in the
Seventh Circuit is probably the most interesting aspect of the case. The plaintiffs' claim
in Jones was that the investment adviser to the mutual fund in question collected
excessive fees for its management services, thereby breaching its "fiduciary duty with
1 43
The district court granted
respect to the receipt of compensation for services."
summary judgment to the defendant, applying the multifactor analysis first adopted by
144
Judge
the Second Circuit in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.
Frank Easterbrook wrote the decision for the Seventh Circuit affirming the grant of
summary judgment, but he departed drastically from the rationale applied by the lower
court. 145 In Easterbrook's view, the fiduciary duty standard of the Investment Company
Act was a limited one: "A fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is
not subject to a cap on compensation." 1 4 6 Easterbrook's support for this narrow
definition of fiduciary duty: the forces of competition, driven by sophisticated investors,
imposed substantial pressure to keep advisory fees low, so judicial scrutiny would add
little. 147 The free market ethos underlying this argument brought a rebuke from, of all
people, Judge Richard Posner, who critiqued Easterbrook's "economic analysis" as being
1 48
"ripe for reexamination."
Easterbrook's aggressive position created a circuit conflict, necessitating Supreme
Court review, but his position got little support there. Both the defendant and the
149
The
government declined to endorse it, instead endorsing the Gartenberg standard.
Court declined to take a position on the Easterbrook/Posner debate: "The debate between
the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding today's
1 50
Instead, the Supreme
mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts."
Court fell into line with the overwhelming weight of lower court authority, endorsing the
Gartenbergstandard as a matter of statutory interpretation.
Justice Alito, writing for the Court, said that Congress meant to adopt the Court's
standard from Pepper v. Litton: "The essence of the test is whether or not under all the
141. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
142. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
143. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
144. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
145. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
146. Id. at 632.
147. Id. at 633-34.
148. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc). Posner's faith in markets has apparently been shaken by the late financial crisis.
149. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1425 (2010).
150. Id.at1430-31.
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circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain." 1 51 Oddly,
Alito offers no reason at all for this conclusion. 152 This is the correct interpretation of the
statute because it is the Court's general interpretation of fiduciary duty. If Congress wants
to deviate from the judicial standard, it will have to say so. Pepper is the standard that the
Justices know.
The Court's endorsement of the Gartenbergstandard appears grudging at best. Alito
emphasized courts should be cautious in comparing fees charged to mutual funds and
institutional investors. 153 He also noted that courts must defer to "the judgment of
disinterested directors apprised of all relevant information" absent "additional evidence
that the fee exceeds the arm's-length range." 1 54 Alito closes with a caution that sounds
much like the business judgment rule: "In reviewing compensation under § 36(b), the Act
does not require courts to engage in a precise calculation of fees representative of arm'slength bargaining .... [C]ourts are not well suited to make such precise calculations." 155
The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's interpretation that would have largely neutered
the Investment Company Act's fiduciary duty standard, but its interpretation of the
Gartenbergstandard is so narrow that plaintiffs face huge obstacles to actually winning
their claims, if the lower courts pay it any heed. The Investment Company Act is an
infrequent visitor to the Supreme Court, so lower courts do not need to worry about tight
monitoring. 156
C. Secondary Liability
If the Roberts Court's forays into Rule lOb-5 class actions discussed above have
generally been plaintiff friendly, decisions on liability for secondary actors are anything
but. The first, Stoneridge Investment Partners,LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. provoked a
(failed) attempt at a legislative override. 157 The second, Janus Capital Group v. First
Derivative Traders, confirmed that the Supreme Court was serious about refusing any
expansion of the implied right of action under Rule lOb-5 and Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act (the authorizing statute for Rule lob-5). 158

151. Id. at 1427 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939)) (emphasis supplied by Jones
Court).
152. Id. at 1427 ("We believe that this formulation expresses the meaning of the phrase 'fiduciary duty' in
§ 36(b) [of the Investment Company Act].").
153. Id. at 1429 ("Even if the services provided and fees charged to an independent fund are relevant,
courts should be mindful that the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual funds and
institutional clients contrary to petitioners' contentions.").
154. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1430.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Justice Thomas, concurring, would have gone still further in distancing the Court from judicial
ratemaking: "I concur in the Court's decision to affirm . .. [b]ut I would not say that in doing so we endorse the
... free-ranging judicial "fairness" review of fees that Gartenberg could be read to authorize, and that virtually
all courts deciding § 36(b) cases since Gartenberg (including the Court of Appeals in this case) have wisely
eschewed ..... Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
157. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
158. Janus Capital, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).
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1. Central Bank
Stoneridge and Janus are sequels to the Rehnquist Court's most controversial effort
to curtail securities class actions-CentralBank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denverl 59-which provoked a partial legislative override of its own. Central Bank, like
Stoneridge, was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy. A brief summary sets the stage for
Stoneridge and Janus. The issue presented in Central Bank was whether private civil
liability under Section 10(b) extends to aiders and abettors of the violation. 160 The open
ended nature of aiding and abetting liability worried Kennedy. In Central Bank, he
warned that uncertainty over the scope of liability could induce secondary actors to settle
"to avoid the expense and risk of going to trial."1 61 The risk of having to pay such
settlements could cause professionals, such as accountants, to avoid newer and smaller
companies, and their litigation costs "may be passed on to their client companies, and in
turn incurred by the company's investors, the intended beneficiaries of the statute." 1 62
In an effort to increase Rule lOb-5's predictability, Kennedy's opinion adopted a
two-part framework for addressing the scope of the private right of action under Section
10(b). 16 3 In the first step of the inquiry, Kennedy examined the text of Section 10(b) to
determine the scope of prohibited conduct. He had little difficulty determining that the
text of Section 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission)
or the commission of a manipulative act." 1 64 This settled the question for Kennedy:
Section 10(b) did not prohibit aiding and abetting.
Nonetheless, Kennedy set forth a second-step to the inquiry:
When the text of § 10(b) does not resolve a particular issue, we attempt to infer
how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the lOb-5 action
been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act. For that inquiry, we use
the express causes of action in the securities Acts as the primary model for the
§ 10(b) action. The reason is evident: Had the 73d Congress enacted a private §
10(b) right of action, it likely would have designed it in a manner similar to the
other private rights of action in the securities Acts. 165
The plaintiffs' argument also failed under this second step, because the explicit
causes of action afforded by Congress in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were
similarly silent on the question of aiding and abetting. 16 6 Whether the question is
resolved under the first or the second step of this inquiry has potentially significant
consequences. When the Court interprets Section 10(b), it is defining not only the limits
159. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
160. Id. at 167.
161. Id. at189.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 177-78.
164. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 177.
165. Id. at 178 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has used the approach of
looking to express causes of action to infer appropriate elements under the implied cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 in other cases. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Purpis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 362 (1991)
(applying statute of limitations from the Securities Act claims to a Rule lOb-5 claim); Musick, Peeler & Garrett
v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 297 (1993) (finding an implied right of contribution under Rule
lob-5 based on express right of contribution under Sections 9 and 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
166. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 180.

HeinOnline -- 37 J. Corp. L. 130 2011-2012

2011]

Securities Law in the Roberts Court

131

of the private cause of action, but also the reach of the SEC's authority. When it
constructs the hypothetical cause of action in the second step, only the private cause of
action is implicated.
In passing, Kennedy touched on an additional problem with the plaintiffs' argument,
which would have important consequences in Stoneridge: "Were we to allow the aiding
and abetting action proposed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any
showing that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and abettor's statements or actions." 1 67
The Court left the door open for some liability for secondary participants, such as
accountants, investment bankers, and lawyers, but only if they have exposed themselves
by inducing investor reliance.1 68 The bottom line after Central Bank: a defendant must
make a misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of a security relies.
Kennedy did not explain further the connection between reliance and the scope of Rule
1Ob-5; that issue would reemerge in Stoneridge.
2. Stoneridge
The scope of a primary violation of Rule lOb-5 came back to the Court in
Stoneridge. The Stoneridge plaintiffs attempted an end run around Central Bank. Instead
of alleging that the secondary defendants had made or participated in the making of a
misstatement, the plaintiffs alleged that the secondary defendants were part of a "scheme
to defraud," thus invoking a separate provision in Rule lOb-5.1 69 The plaintiffs'
complaint in Stoneridge alleged that cable company Charter Communications committed
a massive accounting fraud inflating its reported operating revenues and cash flow. 170
The plaintiffs also named as defendants two equipment suppliers, Motorola and
Scientific-Atlantic.1 7 1 The plaintiffs alleged that Charter paid the suppliers $20 extra for
each cable set-top box in return for the supplier's agreement to make additional payments
back to Charter in the form of advertising fees. 172 Charter then capitalized the $20 extra
expense (shifting the accounting cost into the future) while treating the advertising fees as
current income, artificially boosting Charter's current accounting revenues. 173 The
suppliers had no direct role in preparing or disseminating the fraudulent accounting
information, nor did they approve Charter's financial statements. 174 The plaintiffs
alleged, however, that the vendors facilitated Charter's deceptions by preparing false
documentation and backdating contracts. 175 The district court granted the suppliers'
motion to dismiss, relying on Central Bank to hold that the vendors were not primary
violators under Rule lOb-5.1 76 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the
suppliers had not engaged in any deception because they had made no misstatements, had

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2007).
170. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlantic, 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008).
171. Id.
172. In re Charter Communications, Inc. Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2006).
173. Id. at 990.
174. Id.
175. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767.
176. Id. at 991.
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no duty to disclose to Charter's investors, and had not manipulated Charter's shares. 177
As noted above, the SEC has consistently supported the expansion of private
securities class actions. 17 8 So, too, in Stoneridge, with the majority of the commissioners
voting to file a brief siding with the plaintiffs.1 79 The Solicitor General, however, sided
with the defendants and overruled the agency. 180 Here, the Court adopted the
government's argument essentially in toto, so we have deference to the government, but
not to the SEC.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-3 (with Justice Breyer recused), affirmed. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, rejected the appellate court's holding that there was no
deception, noting that "[c]onduct itself can be deceptive."'81 He instead hung the
affirmance on the other doctrinal point from his Central Bank decision, the
incompatibility of aiding and abetting liability with the "essential element" of reliance. 182
In this case, investors relied on Charter for its financial statements, not the cable set-top
box transactions underlying those financial statements.1 83
Why did Kennedy focus on defendants' conduct, rather than the plaintiffs, when
assessing reliance? According to Kennedy, "reliance is tied to causation, leading to the
inquiry whether [suppliers'] acts were immediate or remote to the injury." 1 84 Kennedy
treats the reliance inquiry as a species of the tort concept of proximate cause. Kennedy's
principal concern was the specter of unlimited liability, as it was in Central Bank: "were
this concept of reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole
marketplace in which the issuing company does business."l 8 5 The plaintiffs theory
threatened to inject the Section 10(b) cause of action into "the realm of ordinary business
operations." 1 86
Kennedy's rationale for limiting the concept of reliance would have more naturally
fit in Section 10(b)'s "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"

177. Id. at993.
178. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraudon the Market, 2009 Wis. L.
REv. 151, 157 (2009) ("[T]he Basic opinion was for all practical purposes drafted by the SEC and the Office of
the Solicitor General. Most all of the key arguments, analysis, quotes and citations that one finds in the Court's
holdings on both materiality and reliance come directly out of the amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of the
SEC.").
179. The vote was 3-2. See Paul Atkins, Just Say 'No' to the TrialLawyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2007, at
A17. Chairman Christopher Cox voted with the majority, despite having introduced the bill that in 1995 that
would have reversed Basic. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 663-64 (3d ed. 2003).
The SEC had filed a brief in a Ninth Circuit case raising similar issues, arguing that "[t]he reliance requirement
is satisfied where a plaintiff relies on a material deception flowing from a defendant's deceptive act, even
though the conduct of other participants in the fraudulent scheme may have been a subsequent link in the causal
chain leading to the plaintiff's securities transaction." Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellant at 12, Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 0455665), availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigationibriefs/homestore_020405.pdf.
180. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43).
181. Stoneridge Iv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008).
182. Id. at 159.
183. Id. at 158.
184. Id. at 160.
185. Id.
186. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 160.
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language. 187 Kennedy pointed to that language, but said that it did not control in this case
because the "in connection with" requirement goes to the "statute's coverage rather than
causation." 1 88 Another reason for not putting the limit into that doctrinal category is that
the Court had only recently affirmed a very broad scope for that requirement. 189 A more
substantial reason is that cabining Rule lOb-5 through the "in connection with the
purchase or sale" requirement would limit not only private plaintiffs, but potentially, the
SEC, whose enforcement authority is limited by the reach of the statute. Kennedy
conceded that the SEC's enforcement authority might reach commercial transactions like
those between Charter and its suppliers, but he was reluctant to grant the same freedom to
the plaintiffs' bar. 190
Given the need to cabin the plaintiffs' bar, but maintain the SEC's discretion, the
reliance requirement was an attractive tool. The reliance requirement, despite being an
"essential element," does not flow from the language of Section 10(b), but is instead
derived from the common law of deceit. 19 1 More importantly for Kennedy's purposes,
reliance does not apply in enforcement actions brought by the SEC or criminal
prosecutions brought by the Justice Department.1 92 Using the reliance element to limit
secondary party liability allowed the Court to have its cake-unfettered government
enforcement-and eat it too-constrain the scope of private actions.
The importance of the SEC's enforcement efforts had been reinforced by Congress's
response to Central Bank. Rebuffing calls to restore aiding-and-abetting liability,
Congress instead gave that authority only to the SEC.1 93 Accepting the plaintiffs
argument in Stoneridge, Kennedy reasoned, would thus "undermine Congress'
determination that this class of defendants should be pursued by the SEC and not by
private litigants."' 94 Kennedy's rationale for the need to constrain private litigants
echoed and amplified his policy concerns from Central Bank. Expanding liability would
undermine the United States' international competitiveness and raise the cost of capital

187. Id. at 156 (quoting Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007)).
188. Id. at 160.
189. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84 (2006) (holding that "the identity
of the plaintiffs does not determine whether the complaint alleges fraud 'in connection with the purchase or
sale' of securities"); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 824-25 (2002) (holding that "a fraudulent scheme in
which the securities transactions and breaches of duty coincide" is "'in connection with' securities sales within
the meaning of § 10(b)").
190. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161 ("Were the implied cause of action to be extended to the practices
described here ... there would be a risk that the federal power would be used to invite litigation beyond the
immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already governed by functioning and effective state-law
guarantees.").
191. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc. 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding the failure to include
a reasonable reliance requirement in the language of Section 10(b) "as an inadequate reason for reading out the
rule so basic an element of tort law as the principle of causation in fact").
192. Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The SEC is not required to prove reliance or
injury in enforcement actions."); United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549-51 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the
government need not prove reliance in criminal case).
193. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006)). Congress recently expanded the SEC's authority by
reducing the state of mind requirement from knowledge to recklessness. See H.R. REP. No. 111-4173, § 9290
(2010) (amending § 20(e) of the Exchange Act).
194. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 163.
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because companies would be reluctant to do business with American issuers. Issuers
might list their shares elsewhere to avoid these burdens. 195
Looking at the question of reliance, it is difficult to extract any consistent guiding
principle from the Court's decisions. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Stoneridge (as he had
in Central Bank), hammered on this point:
Basic is surely a sufficient response to the argument that a complaint alleging
that deceptive acts which had a material effect on the price of a listed stock
should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were not subjectively aware of the
deception at the time of the securities' purchase or sale.
The fraud-on-the-market presumption helps investors who cannot demonstrate
that they, themselves, relied on fraud that reached the market. But that
presumption says nothing about causation from the other side: what an
individual or corporation must do in order to have "caused" the misleading
information that reached the market. The Court thus has it backwards when it
first addresses the fraud-on-the-market presumption, rather than the causation
required.1 96
It is fair to say that Justice Blackmun, who wrote the Affiliated Ute and Basic
reliance decisions, 19 7 would have reached a different outcome in Stoneridge. As
Blackmun observed after reviewing the Affiliated Ute briefs, "I feel we should plump for
a high standard in this area, and that this is in line with the intent of Congress in enacting
the legislation." 198 A generation before, Blackmun set a "high standard" in Affiliated Ute
and Basic; Kennedy ratcheted it down in Central Bank, and again in Stoneridge. Stevens
pushed, unsuccessfully, to further Blackmun's legacy in expanding the Rule lOb-5
private cause of action. 199
The point is not that one side or the other is correct in their divining of congressional
intent. That quest seems futile. Rule lOb-5's reliance element is nowhere to be found in
the language of Section 10(b) or Rule 1Ob-5; the Court borrowed it from the common law
of deceit. Despite that borrowing, the Court does not refer to the common law when it is
interpreting the reliance requirement for the Rule 1Ob-5 private cause of action. In
Stoneridge, Kennedy brusquely rejected the argument that the plaintiffs had adequately
pled reliance under common law standards: "Even if the assumption is correct, it is not
controlling. Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law." 200 It
would seem more accurate to say that the incorporation is selective: the Court borrows

195. Id. at 163-64.
196. Id. at 170-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988).
198. Harry A. Blackmun, Memo, No. 70-78 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States (Oct. 18, 1971) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Papers).
199. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 175-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A theme that underlies the Court's analysis
is its mistaken hostility towards the § 10(b) private cause of action. The Court's current view of implied causes
of action is that they are merely a relic of our prior heady days.") (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. Id. at 162.
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the common law element of reliance, without really explaining why, but then disregards
it when inconvenient. Kennedy's rejection of common law standards in Stoneridge
suggests that the Court is charting its own common law course. The Court's
interventions, however, are episodic; the Court takes an insufficient number of securities
cases to develop this "common law" in any meaningful manner. Will the larger number
of cases heard by the Roberts Court change this? Given the framing of the debates in
these cases, it seems unlikely.
Kennedy's two-part interpretive approach in Central Bank purports to depart from
the common law interpretation that typified Rule lOb-5 for many years. Cases like
Affiliated Ute and Basic focused on assuring recovery for plaintiffs, with little regard for
the costs created by private litigation. The Court used a common law, policy-oriented
approach when it was expanding the Rule 1Ob-5 private cause of action, then seen as an
"essential supplement" to SEC enforcement. 20 1 Central Bank promised a textual,
formalist approach when the Court turned to reining in the reach of the private cause of
action. Stoneridge, with its return to a fuzzy "requisite causal connection" notion of
reliance, 202 fails to deliver on that promise, instead returning to common law decisionmaking. The opinion does little more than tell us that the defendants' conduct was "too
remote" for plaintiffs to rely on. 203 Both factions of the Court manipulate the reliance
element to scale the scope of the securities fraud cause of action to their liking. Lately,
the faction resisting expansion has prevailed.
3. Janus
Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders204 is the Roberts Court's second
decision addressing secondary liability under Rule lOb-5. The only real surprise coming
out in Janus is that it is authored by Justice Thomas, rather than Justice Kennedy. The
outcome is entirely predictable: the Court rebuffed efforts by the plaintiffs' bar to rope in
secondary defendants under Rule IOb-5.
The defendants in Janus were Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), the public company
behind the Janus family of mutual funds, and Janus Capital Management LLC (JCM), its
wholly-owned subsidiary that acted as the investment advisor to the Janus funds. 205 Janus
Investment Fund, of the mutual funds in the Janus family, was caught up in the market
timing scandals of 2003 when the New York Attorney General accused JCG and JCM of
allowing certain investors to purchase shares in the mutual fund based on stale prices. 206
The allegations led to substantial redemptions from the mutual funds. They also led to a
sharp drop in the share price of JCG, which earned fees, through its subsidiary JCM,
based upon a percentage of assets under management. 207 A class action suit followed. 2 08
The problem for the suit was that the misstatements alleged-about policies
discouraging market timing-were all in prospectuses issued by Janus Investment Fund,
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,243 (1988)).
Id. at 161.
Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
Id at 2299.
Id at 2300.
Id
Id at 2297.
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not JCG or JCM. 209 The plaintiffs nonetheless alleged that JCM should be held primarily
liable for the misstatements in those prospectuses, and that JCG could be held liable as
the "control person" of JCM under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 2 10 Critically, the
plaintiffs did not allege that JCM should be held liable as the control person of the Janus
Investment Fund, despite the fact that all of the officers of the mutual fund were also
officers of JCM. 2 11 This omission proved fatal to their case. 2 12
Justice Thomas framed the issue as whether JCM had "'made' the material
misstatements in the prospectuses," 2 13 which CentralBank had set out as the requirement
for primary liability. Thomas rejected the argument of plaintiffs and the government as
amicus that "make" should be defined as "create," 214 offering two principal reasons to
justify that conclusion. The first was based on dictionary definitions, with the Court's
citation to the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary and the 1934 edition of
Webster's New International Dictionary trumping the government's reference to the 1958
definition of Webster's. 2 15 The flavor of Thomas's dictionary argument can only be
captured by a somewhat lengthy quotation:
One "makes" a statement by stating it. When "make" is paired with a noun
expressing the action of a verb, the resulting phrase is "approximately
equivalent in sense" to that verb. For instance, "to make a proclamation" is the
approximate equivalent of "to proclaim," and "to make a promise"
approximates "to promise." The phrase at issue in Rule lOb-5, "[t]o make
any ... statement," is thus the approximate equivalent of "to state." For
purposes of Rule lOb-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with
ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and
how to communicate it. Without control, a person or entity can merely suggest
what to say, not "make" a statement in its own right. One who prepares or
publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker. And in the ordinary
case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances
is strong evidence that a statement was made by-and only by-the party to
whom it is attributed. This rule might best be exemplified by the relationship
between a speechwriter and a speaker. Even when a speechwriter drafts a
speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it.
And it is the speaker who takes credit-or blame-for what is ultimately
said. 2 16
One can agree or disagree with the Court's linguistic analysis. What is notable here
is that the Court is not interpreting Section 10(b), which presumably entails an effort to
discern what Congress meant 1934, but instead, Rule lOb-5, which the SEC promulgated
in 1942. The Court is refusing to defer to the SEC on the interpretation of its own rule.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
Id. at 2301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303.
Id at 2302-03.
Id. at 2302 (citations omitted).
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Why? The Court found the definition of "make" to be unambiguous; more telling
perhaps, the Court had "previously expressed skepticism over the degree to which the
SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action" and "[t]his also is not
the first time this Court has disagreed with the SEC's broad view of § 10(b) or Rule lOb5."217 Shades of Justice Powell! These contentions are nonetheless somewhat odd; the
Court usually couches the limits it places on the private cause of action as a matter of
interpreting Section 10(b), not Rule lOb-5. 2 18 But "make" does not appear in Section
10(b). Perhaps this leaves open the possibility that the SEC can amend Rule lOb-5 to
incorporate its preferred "create" standard?
Not likely. The Court tied its Janus holding to its prior rejections of broadened
secondary liability in Central Bank and Stoneridge.2 19 Thomas's opinion is initially
grounded in textualism, but one suspects that precedent played a much larger role in
determining the outcome in Janus. The plaintiff s theory of liability looked too much like
the secondary defendant's "substantial assistance" in Central Bank and the fraudulent
transactions that were later incorporated into false public statements in Stoneridge.220
That ship had long since sailed by the time Janus made it to the Supreme Court.
The Court's final justification for its ruling puts the final nail in the possibility of
agency rulemaking to expand liability under the Rule 10b-5 private cause of action:
[Plaintiffs final] theory of liability based on a relationship of influence
resembles the liability imposed by Congress for control [by Section 20(a)]. To
adopt [that] theory [of liability] would read into Rule 1Ob-5 a theory of liability
similar to-but broader in application than-what Congress has already created
expressly elsewhere. 221
Here the Court identifies the statutory constraint missing from its linguistic analysis:
Rule lOb-5 must be read to fit with Section 20(b). To put it differently, the SEC cannot
do an end run around the limitations in Section 20(b) through a broad interpretation of its
rulemaking authority under Section 10(b).
Janus, like Central Bank and Stoneridge before it, provoked a vigorous dissent.
Breyer, writing for four dissenters, predictably took issue with the majority's linguistic
analysis, finding considerably more play in the joints of "make" as a verb. 222 Ultimately,
it is difficult to say who wins this tussle; you agree with one side or the other depending
on what "make" means. Breyer also disputed that Central Bank and Stoneridge were
controlling; the former addressed aiding and abetting, while the latter turned on
reliance. 223 Responding to Thomas's point that the plaintiffs broad theory of Rule lOb-5
would usurp Section 20(a), Breyer worried that the majority's construction would create
217. Id. at 2303 n.8 (citations omitted).
218. See Ernst Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("[D]espite the broad view of the Rule
advanced by the Commission in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by
Congress under § 10(b).").
219. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304-05.
220. See id. at 2303-05 (determining that providing the "substantial assistance" in Central Bank and the
fraudulent transactions in Stoneridge were insufficient theories of liability).
221. Id. at 2304 (citations omitted).
222. Id. at 2305, 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The English language does not impose upon the word
'make' boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative.").
223. Id. at 2307-10.
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a loophole for "cases in which one actor exploits another as an innocent intermediary for
its misstatements." 224 Breyer contended that this possibility applied to the facts of Janus:
"Here, it may well be that the Fund's board of trustees knew nothing about the falsity of
the prospectuses." 22 5 This, according to Breyer, was "the 13th stroke of the new rule's
clock." 226 In Breyer's view, potentially no one could be liable for misstatements in the
prospectus.
Here is the real distinction between Janus and Stoneridge. In Stoneridge, Kennedy
shoehorned the Court's holding into the reliance requirement, even though it would have
fit more naturally into the "in connection with" requirement. The reason for that move
was straightforward: reliance applied to private plaintiffs but not the SEC. The Janus
holding, by contrast, limits both private plaintiffs, as well as the SEC because its aidingand-abetting authority also requires a primary violation. 22 7
But that analysis applies only to Rule 10b-5. It does not determine the outcome
under Section 20(b), as Breyer concedes, 228 but it also does not address the outcome
under Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act or Section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers
Act, neither of which require scienter, 229 or under the books and records provision of
Section 13 of the Exchange Act, which is a strict liability provision. None of these
provisions gives rise to a private cause of action, but the SEC has all the authority it
needs to close Breyer's loophole through its enforcement efforts. Indeed, JCM paid a
$100 million penalty to the SEC based on the market-timing conduct. 230
If private causes of action are the concern, does an enterprising plaintiffs attorney
have to look very far under state law to find a breach of duty to the investment company
if the investment advisor is introducing misstatements into the mutual fund's prospectus?
The investment company itself, along with its CEO, CFO, directors, and underwriters,
faces the threat of suit under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) for misstatements in the
registration statement. All that is being sacrificed by Janus's narrow construction of Rule
1Ob-5 is the fraud-on-the-market suit against the public holding company, and one can
question the marginal deterrence provided by such suits in the highly regulated area of
mutual funds. For run of the mill misstatements made by public companies, it is hard to
see any broad implications from Janus. The plaintiffs' bar should still be able to pin to
the company the acts of its agents.
Janus provides additional evidence of the Roberts Court's lack of engagement with
the securities laws. Only Sections 20(b) is mentioned in the majority's opinion, and then
only in a footnote. 23 1 Neither the majority, nor the dissent, grapples with the complicated
regulatory overlap of the securities laws to determine precisely what is given up by
limiting the Rule 10b-5 cause of action.

224. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2311.
229. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 (1980); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
230. In the Matter of Janus Capital Mgmt., Exchange Act Release No. 2277, 2004 WL 1845502 (Aug. 18,
2004) (finding that JCM willfully violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act, Sections
17(d) and 34(b) of the Investment Company Act, and Rule 17d-1 thereunder).
231. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10.
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D. Foreign Class Actions
The second area where the Roberts Court has confined securities class actions is the
extraterritorial reach of the federal securities laws. Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank
Ltd. was a so-called "F-cubed" securities class action: Australian investors who had
purchased common shares of the largest Australian bank over the Australian Stock
Exchange. 232
The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
Second Circuit affirmed. 2 33 The Second Circuit had developed a two-prong test to
determine whether the application of the U.S. securities laws was appropriate.
Jurisdiction to adjudicate a Section 10(b) claim would exist if the plaintiff could show
either: (1) an effect of American securities markets or investors; or (2) significant
conduct relating to the fraud taking place in the United States. 234 The Morrison plaintiffs
disclaimed reliance on the effects prong because the American investor who purchased
National Australia's ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange was dismissed from the
litigation at an early stage. 235 The conduct at issue was the inflation of the value of assets
of HomeSide, a wholly-owned subsidiary of National Australia operating a mortgage
servicing business out of Florida. 236 The plaintiffs alleged that HomeSide had
exaggerated the value of its mortgage servicing contracts and that these exaggerated
figures were passed through to National Australia's consolidated balance sheet, thereby
causing National Australia's stock to trade at an inflated value. 237 When National
Australia eventually wrote down the value of HomeSide's assets, the price of National
Australia's stock plummeted and the plaintiffs filed suit. 238 The Second Circuit, however,
said that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the Australian investors' claims
because conduct in Australia was the source of the alleged misrepresentations. 239
The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari, and the Supreme Court asked for the
Solicitor General's views. In the government's amicus brief, the Solicitor General argued
that the Second Circuit had erred in treating the question as jurisdictional, rather than
relating to the merits. 24 0 Turning to the merits, the government argued that the Second
Circuit was at once too restrictive and too generous in conferring jurisdiction over
Section 10(b) claims. Too restrictive, because the Second Circuit had held that private
plaintiffs and the SEC should be held to the same standard; the government argued that it
should be held to a lower standard. 24 1 Perhaps taking their cue from Stoneridge, the
232. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875-76 (2010).
233. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
234. SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
235. In re Nat'1 Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 2006).
236. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2876.
239. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2008) ("NAB, not HomeSide, is the publicly
traded company, and its executives-assisted by lawyers, accountants, and bankers-take primary responsibility
for the corporation's public filings, for its relations with investors, and for its statements to the outside world.").
240. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9-13, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl.
Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-8-1191), 2010 WL 719337.
241. Id. at 30 (criticizing the holding of SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003) that the same
jurisdictional standard applies to private plaintiffs and SEC).
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government urged that the correct standard for enforcement and criminal actions was
what it characterized as the full reach of Section 10(b): "[A] transnational securities fraud
violates Section 10(b) when the fraud involves significant conduct in the United States
that is material to the fraud's success." 242 For private plaintiffs, additional restrictions
were in order; specifically, a private plaintiff should be required to "establish not simply
that his loss resulted from the fraudulent scheme as a whole, but that the loss resulted
directly from the component of the fraud that occurred in the United States." 243
The SEC's efforts to throw the plaintiffs under the bus were to no avail. The Court
rejected not only the plaintiffs' claim, but also the government's argument that private
actions should be held to a higher standard. Justice Scalia wrote for the majority; he was
clearly a jurist on a mission. After summarily dispatching the Second Circuit's "threshold
error" in treating the question as jurisdictional, 244 Scalia turned to dismantling the
Second Circuit's conduct and effects test. The Second Circuit, noting the silence of
Section 10(b) on extraterritorial effect, had taken it upon itself to divine what Congress
would have done if it had thought about the question. What would the Second Circuit's
hypothetical Congress do: (1) protect American investors; or (2) discourage fraudsters
from operating out of the United States? In Scalia's view, however, the Second Circuit's
test was wrong from its inception. The Second Circuit's test failed to accord due weight
to the Court's longstanding presumption against giving statutes extraterritorial effect:
"When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none." 24 5 The Second Circuit had gone off the tracks when it had inferred from Section
10(b)'s silence on the question of extraterritorial application an invitation to engage in
"judicial-speculation-made-law-divining what Congress would have wanted if it had
thought of the situation before the court." 24 6 That judicial speculation was bad enough,
but it had led to "unpredictable and inconsistent application of Section 10(b) to
transnational cases." 247 From Scalia's perspective, "[t]here is no more damning
indictment of the 'conduct' and 'effects' tests than the Second Circuit's own declaration
that 'the presence or absence of any single factor which was considered significant in
other cases . .. is not necessarily dispositive in future cases."' 248 Judicially created out of
whole cloth, and unpredictable to boot? A recipe for a Scalia tirade on the proper role of
judges. The Solicitor General's somewhat cosmetic repackaging of that test fared no
better.24 9 Nor was the SEC's endorsement of that test entitled to deference as it was
premised on the judicial errors committed by the Second Circuit. 250
And what does Scalia see as the proper role of judges? Reading statutes for their
ordinary meaning. Having debunked the Second Circuit's approach, Scalia was forced to
devise his own rule of decision. Unsurprisingly, he argued that his preferred test was

242. Id at 16.
243. Id at 26.
244. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010).
245. Id. at 2878.
246. Id. at 2881.
247. Id. at 2880 (citing numerous commentators).
248. Id. at 2879 (quoting UT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (1980)).
249. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
250. Id. at 2887-88 ("Since the Commission's interpretations relied on cases we disapprove, which
ignored or discarded the presumption against extraterritoriality, we owe them no deference.").
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grounded in the text of the statute. 25 1 Examining the text of Section 10(b), Scalia found
that the focus was not on deception, but rather, the provision's requirement that
deception, to be actionable, must be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
252
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered."
The purchase or sale transaction, Scalia thought, was the touchstone of what Congress
sought to regulate; Congress sought to protect purchasers and sellers. 253 This analysis of
Section 10(b)'s text led Scalia to his test for its application: "transactions in securities
listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities." 254 Scalia's
conclusion derived from the statutory text was bolstered by the structure of the statute. 2 55
Scalia also worried about "the probability of incompatibility with the applicable
laws of other countries." 2 56 On this point, the Court appears to have been swayed by the
amicus briefs filed by a number of foreign governments who protested the exposure of
companies headquartered in their jurisdictions to American class actions. 257 When the
Second Circuit was developing its "conduct" and "effects" test, the United States was the
only game in town for securities class actions, so the Second Circuit's imperialism was
not directly stepping on the toes of any foreign government. Many countries object,
however, to the exposure of their companies to our class action regime, a point noted by
Justice Scalia. 2 58 Most countries remain skeptical of the utility of the class action as an
enforcement device. A handful, however, most notably Australia and Canada, recently
have adopted securities class action regimes of their own. 2 59 The conflict with American
law becomes more acute when companies are also subject to class action suit in their
home jurisdictions. The threat of over-deterrence posed by double liability is obvious.
On the opposite end was Justice Stevens' concurrence. 260 Continuing his lonely
defense of the Rule 1Ob-5 private cause of action, Stevens embraced the Second Circuit's
"conduct" and "effects" test, and more generally, the judiciary's role in creating the
Section 10(b) cause of action. 26 1
The development of § 10(b) law was hardly an instance of judicial usurpation.
Congress invited an expansive role for judicial elaboration when it crafted such
an open-ended statute in 1934. And both Congress and the Commission

251. Id at 2884.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
255. Id. at 2885 (parsing Sections 30(a), (b) of the Exchange Act, which provide for limited extraterritorial
effect).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2885-86 (citing briefs filed by Australia, Great Britain, and France).
258. Id. at 2886 ("While there is no reason to believe that the United States has become the Barbary Coast
for those perpetrating frauds on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has become the Shangri-La of
class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets.")
259. See Ashley Black & Kathleen Harris, Corporate class actions in Australia, MALLESONS STEPHEN
JACQUES (June 15, 2006), www.mallesons.com/publications/marketAlerts/2006/Documents/8472865W.htm
(outlining developing trends in Australian corporate claim actions); A.C. Pritchard & Janis P. Sarra, Securities
Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Actions in Canada, 47
ALBERTA L. REv. 881 (2010) (discussing securities class action in Canada).
260. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888-95.
261. Id at 2889.
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subsequently affirmed that role when they left intact the relevant statutory and
262
regulatory language, respectively, throughout all the years that followed.
Stevens gave considerable weight to the fact the Second Circuit test was longstanding. 2 63 More pointedly, while agreeing with the Court's conclusion, he reiterated his
lament from Stoneridge, decrying "the Court's continuing campaign to render the private
cause of action under § 10(b) toothless." 264
The Morrison decision produced an immediate, if somewhat clumsy, reaction from
Congress. Less than a month after the decision was handed down, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a wholesale reform of
financial regulation in the wake of the recent financial crisis. 265 Among its reforms was
one aimed at overruling the result in Morrison, as the bill's legislative history makes
clear: "This bill's provisions concerning extraterritoriality . .. are intended to rebut
[Morrison]'s presumption by clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial
application in cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department." 266 Unfortunately,
Congress enacted language ensuring only that the courts would have jurisdictionto hear
cases with extraterritorial application, not that Section 10(b) would have extraterritorial
application. 267 Thus, Congress repeated the Second Circuit's error of treating the scope
of the law as jurisdictional, rather than a merits question. Even if the courts ignore the
provision's language and follow its intent to expand the substantive scope of Section
10(b), it applies only to actions brought by the SEC or the Justice Department (private
plaintiffs won only a study by the SEC, which is required to report to Congress within
eighteen months of Dodd-Frank's passage). 2 68 Congress's reaction is rather humorous in
light of Justice Scalia's claim that one benefit of a clear presumption against
extraterritorial application is that it "preserv[es] a stable background against which
Congress can legislate with predictable effects." 269 The "predictable effects" that Justice
Scalia claims for his rule are premised on an assumption of minimal competence on the
part of Congress (or the SEC, which likely drafted the bumbling language, although one
assumes that they attempted to fix it after Morrison was handed down). That assumption
proved unjustified in this case; it does not appear that anyone on Capitol Hill bothered to
read Justice Scalia's opinion. Will courts follow Dodd-Frank's legislative history, or its
text, when it comes to interpreting the extraterritorial provision?
E. Anti-PlaintiffCourt?
At the time that Roberts was nominated to be the Chief Justice, there were claims
that he would head a "pro business" Court. The majority of the decisions of Roberts
Court, however, if anything show a bias toward the status quo. Tellabs, Halliburton,and
262. Id at 2890 (Stevens, J. concurring).
263. Id at 2895 (Stevens, J. concurring) (criticizing the majority for paying "short shrift ... to the
accumulated wisdom and experience of the lower courts").
264. Id. (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 175
(2008) (Stevens J., dissenting)).
265. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
266. 111 CONG. REC. 5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Congressman Paul B. Kanjorski).
267. H.R. REP. No. 111-4173, § 929P(b) (2010).
268. Id. § 929Y.
269. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
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Jones all rebuffed efforts by lower courts to narrow the gates through which securities
class actions could proceed. 270 A fair-minded scorekeeper would have to put these
decisions in the plaintiffs column, despite the defendant's nominal victory in Tellabs. In
Tellabs, the Supreme Court reversed a lenient Seventh Circuit decision for drawing
inferences with respect to scienter, but replaced it with a standard that is nonetheless
relatively generous to plaintiffs. 27 1 In so doing, the Court rejected a more stringent
standard adopted by a number of lower courts and urged by both the government as
amicus and the dissenting Justices. On balance, the Tellabs decision was likely a net
benefit to the plaintiffs' bar. Both Tellabs and Jones are cautious decisions grounded in
conventional approaches to statutory interpretation. Halliburton reverses a rogue lower
court decision with little basis in the Supreme Court's precedent. Matrixx affirms the
Roberts Court's bias toward the status quo, continuing the Court's open-ended approach
to materiality from TSC and Basic. If the Roberts Court has a "pro-business" agenda, its
selection of cases for review seems poorly suited for promoting its aims.
Stoneridge and Morrison, by contrast adopt considerably more aggressive language.
Both decisions rebuffed efforts by the plaintiffs' bar to expand the pool of potential
defendants; Stoneridge to third party defendants, Morrison to foreign companies. The
perceived disregard of Supreme Court precedents by lower courts in these cases were
calculated to provoke hot button responses from individual Justices. In Stoneridge, it was
Justice Kennedy, who likely saw "scheme liability" as an attempt to do an end run around
the holding of his Central Bank opinion (Janus, although it resolved a lower court split,
simply confirmed the trend established by Stoneridge). In Morrison, Justice Scalia was
provoked by the Second Circuit's disregard for the Court's presumption against
extraterritorial application. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that the rhetoric in
Stoneridge and Morrison takes on a more muscular tone. These decisions reflect the
Roberts Court bringing the lower courts to heel. It is reaction to the lower courts'
waywardness, rather than any agenda peculiar to the securities laws, that drives the more
strident tenor of those decisions.
V. CONCLUSION

The Roberts Court's work in the field of securities law demonstrates what happens
when a court of general jurisdiction is charged with making decisions in an area with
which it is unfamiliar. Analysis of the Court's decisions yields few, if any, common
threads tying them together as a body of work. Whatever direction the securities laws
take in the Supreme Court, do not expect opinions to grapple more seriously with the
interplay between securities law and the securities markets anytime soon. The
randomness of the Roberts Court's securities jurisprudence results in part from the stream
of cases that make their way on to the Court's docket. It is also a product, however, of the
absence of any individual Justice having an interest in the field. A comparison with
Lewis Powell's tenure on the Court illustrates the point. Powell drew on his background
as a corporate lawyer to push the Court in a particular direction during his time on the
270. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issue & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); Jones v. Harris Assoc. LP, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
271. It is worth noting the plaintiffs' case withstood the motion to dismiss on remand in Tellabs. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Court, reining in securities class actions and imposing a common law framework on the
SEC's vendetta against insider trading. 272
The Roberts Court does not have a figure like Powell in the field of securities law.
To be sure, the increased number of securities cases heard by the Roberts Court relative
to the Rehnquist Court suggests that the Court recognizes the significance of the
securities laws. But it agrees to hear securities cases because there is a circuit split, not
because it is anxious to impose its mark on the field of securities law. The debates that
engage the Justices in these cases do not come from the field of securities laws, but
rather, are more general: statutory interpretation, the use of legislative history, the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of legislation, etc.
What does this lack of agenda mean for securities law? First, it means that the path
of law is somewhat unpredictable. It is hard to know when a Justice will be so galvanized
by a particular issue that he takes ownership of it, such as Justice Kennedy with aiding
and abetting. Second, absent a galvanizing issue, there is likely to be a presumption in
favor of the position taken by the government. This attitude of occasional deference
means that the relationship between the SEC and the Solicitor General takes on critical
importance. If the SEC can persuade the Solicitor General, its position is likely to prevail
in the Roberts Court. With a Democrat currently in the White House, the SEC and the
Solicitor General are likely to see eye-to-eye in the near term. If Republicans regain
control of the White House, that could change. For now though, the government is likely
to take positions that maximize the SEC's reach, as it did in Morrison (albeit
unsuccessfully).
No Justice is likely to push securities law in a more aggressive direction than the
SEC. The retirement of Justice Stevens means that there is no one left on the Court with
any pretensions of being an activist in the field, particularly in the area of the private right
of action. Justice Ginsberg, writing for the Tellabs majority, made it clear that the Court
intends to defer to Congress in this area: "It is the federal lawmaker's prerogative . . . to
allow, disallow, or shape the contours of-including the pleading and proof requirements
for-§ 10(b) private actions." 2 73 This language suggests we should not expect the Court
to be anything more than a passive observer here; major changes, if any, will come from
Congress.
The Roberts Court's cautious attitude is a departure for the Supreme Court. The
Court's treatment of the basic question regarding the existence of the implied private
right of action in Stoneridge sends a clear signal that the Court's expansionist days are
over in the field of securities law. Kennedy made it clear that the initial implication of a
private cause of action had been a mistake; under current doctrine, private causes of
action are based only on explicit instruction from Congress. 274 Having recognized the
mistake, the Court was not going to compound the error: "Concerns with the judicial
creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision to extend
the cause of action is for Congress, not for us. Though it remains the law, the § 10(b)

272. See Pritchard,supra note 2, at 863-91 (discussing Justice Powell's efforts to curtail lawsuit).
273. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 327.
274. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008) ("Though the rule once
may have been otherwise, it is settled that there is an implied cause of action only if the underlying statute can
be interpreted to disclose the intent to create one.") (internal citations omitted).
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private right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries." 275 Thus, Stoneridge
stands for the proposition that the Rule lob-5 cause of action is now frozen, at least when
it comes to the expansion of liability by the Court. 276 Expansion of the cause of action
will have to come from Congress, if it is to come at all. This attitude of deference is a far
cry from the heady days of the Warren Court, or even Justice Blackmon's expansionist
push in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. Securities law in the Roberts Court is likely to be focused
on maintaining the status quo.

275. Id. at 165.
276. See id. at 150 ("[W]hen [the aiding and abetting provision of the PSLRA] was enacted, Congress
accepted the § 10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no further."); see also Janus
Capital Group. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011) ("Our holding also accords with
the narrow scope that we must give the implied private right of action.").
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